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My aim is to provide a broad framework for understanding and
building on the Nicholson decision.' While I touch on some of the fac-
tual issues that arose in the case with respect to how domestic violence
impacts children, my major concerns are with the conceptual, historical
and political context in which the case was set. In particular, I want to
address the case as a particular moment in the history of the relationship
between the battered women's movement and the Child Protective Ser-
vices (CPS) system, the flawed understanding of domestic violence that
mediated this relationship and continues to shape how CPS responds to
battered women, and the implications for improved practice of our grow-
ing appreciation of the power dynamics involved in woman battering. I
also describe the dilemmas created for women like Ms. Nicholson, what
I call "the battered mother's dilemma," because of the discrepancy be-
tween what battered women typically experience and how domestic vio-
lence is identified and managed.2
I. WHAT IS THE QUESTION?
I entered the Nicholson case with a Manichean view of the parties
involved. Having been involved in the battered women's movement for
over thirty years as an advocate, researcher and forensic social worker, I
had learned not to idealize battered women or their behavior as mothers.
Still, when you meet Ms. Nicholson, Ms. Tillet or the other plaintiff
mothers, it is hard to avoid the impression that you're dealing with genu-
ine pioneers, women with a courage to "talk truth to power" that is rare
anywhere, let alone among the most vulnerable sectors of the population.
By contrast, I viewed the CPS system as a disaster. For the last three
years, as a member of the Nicholson Review Committee (NRC), I re-
t Evan Stark teaches in the Graduate Department of Public Administration at Rutgers
University-Newark and Chairs the Department of Urban Health Administration on the Newark
Campus of the UMDNJ School of Public Health. A founder of one of the nation's first shelters for
battered women, Dr. Stark testified as a domestic violence expert for the plaintiffs in Nicholson and
served as their representative on the Nicholson Review Committee. The following is a transcript of
remarks made on March 3, 2005 at the Denver University Law Review Symposium, "Children and
the Courts: Is Our System Truly Just?"
1. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
2. For a review of my testimony that documents our factual claims in the case, see generally
Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protective Service Caseload: Developing an Appro-
priate Response, 23 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 107, 107-131 (2002).
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viewed complaints about Administration for Children's Services (ACS)
and dozens of family court petitions, met regularly with ACS leadership
and with other members of our panel trying to craft workable solutions
that would bring ACS into compliance with Judge Weinstein's injunc-
tion.3 I have not substantially changed my overall assessment of the CPS
system. But I have a far greater appreciation of the quality of commit-
ment and intellect at CPS agencies like ACS. And this appreciation is
the basis for one of the key questions raised by Nicholson: given such
talent and commitment, why do CPS agencies behave so badly towards
battered mothers?
4
Lest my praise seem backhanded, let me state what I couldn't say
publicly when I served as an advocate for the plaintiff mothers in the
review process. I believe that ACS's work on domestic violence is state
of the art and that its leadership in this area is exemplary. Before and
during their attempts at compliance, ACS consulted regularly with a
number of the nation's leading domestic violence experts, including
Lonnie Davis, Richard Gelles, Susan Schecter, Jeffrey Edelson, and
Kathryn Conroy. Elizabeth Roberts, the head of domestic violence pol-
icy at ACS, is a savvy and experienced practitioner with direct ties to the
Massachusetts child welfare system widely considered to have a model
domestic violence response. Before and after the trial, ACS maintained
regular contact with the William Casey Foundation and a body of exper-
tise through the foundation that is at the cutting edge of the issues raised
by the case. William Bell, the agency head during much of our efforts to
bring ACS into compliance, now works at Casey. Linda Spears from the
National Child Welfare League, who represented ACS on the NRC and
consulted with them throughout the compliance process, not only has a
working knowledge of how the two systems operate, but a principled
commitment to women's autonomy that is rare among persons so closely
identified with the child welfare system. And John Mattingly, the cur-
rent Commissioner of ACS, helped to fund the NRC and is one of the
most progressive voices nationally in child welfare.
I emphasize these points because the actions ACS took against Ms.
Nicholson and her co-litigants, charging them with neglect and removing
their children solely because the mothers were victims of domestic vio-
lence, could easily be misinterpreted as the work of a backwater crowd
of bureaucratic misogynists insensitive to the most basic principles of
respect.5 Indeed, when I asked a close colleague in the field who has
first-hand experience with ACS why she thought an agency with this
quality of outside consultation could have produced such draconian poli-
cies, she drew on her South Jersey farm roots to quip, "You can't make a
3. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
4. See id. at 219-20.
5. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
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silk purse from a sow's ear." My own view, however, is that a major
lesson from Nicholson is that the peculiar biases to which child protec-
tion is predisposed by its mission, programmatic structure and peculiar
role in our society allow and may even compel even its most progressive
personnel to engage in morally and constitutionally indefensible prac-
tices with respect to mothers in general and in particular to the class of
primarily disadvantaged and/or minority women who were the plaintiffs
in Nicholson. Moreover, I also believe ACS's actions were the logical
result of setting a view of domestic violence and how it harms children
into a narrow mandate that effectively excludes from its purview the
actions necessary to respond appropriately to cases of woman battering.
A common view when we began the Nicholson case was that "they
didn't get it," meaning that ACS leadership was stunningly naYve about
the reality of battered women's experience. While this is true to a certain
degree, in general the knowledge base from which CPS approaches bat-
tered women in its caseload is substantially the same as the knowledge
base that guides the advocacy movement. Indeed, the domestic violence
principles and guidelines ACS staff is asked to implement through their
case practice emphasize support for non-offending parents and children
and "accountability" for offending parents, the same tenets that guide the
battered women's movement. If the practices and outcomes of ACS in-
volvement for women and children are dramatically different than the
practices and outcomes when shelters or other advocacy organizations
are involved, this reflects the very different organizational and political
contexts in which these responses are shaped. These contexts and the
conceptual foundation on which they are built must be changed if we
hope to improve the outcome of CPS intervention with battered women
and their children.
Even a cursory review of ACS's organizational chart made it appar-
ent that frontline service staff (e.g. child protection supervisors and case-
workers) were not accountable to the domestic violence expertise on
board. Elizabeth Roberts, the titular head of domestic violence policies
at ACS, had no line authority over casework practice whatsoever, a point
I emphasized in my testimony.6 ACS continually reiterated during the
trial that removal solely for domestic violence was not their "policy.",7
But this defense was transparent. The written policies at ACS with re-
spect to domestic violence were only marginally related to actual prac-
tice. In marked contrast to the principles enunciating the importance of
"empowerment" for battered women, for example, was a standing direc-
tive from a previous commissioner that instructed caseworkers to resolve
"any ambiguity regarding the safety of the child ... in favor of removing
the child from harm's way."8 With this directive in hand, no account-
6. Stark, supra note 2, at 128.
7. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11.
8. Stark, supra note 2, at 128.
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ability for punitive practices in domestic violence cases, no technical
assistance on board to help resolve the ambiguities that are commonplace
in these cases, and a legal staff whose burnout was matched by the ease
with which their petitions were granted by family court judges, removal
(with or without a court order) became the agencies effective policy.
The problem here was not a lack of training. When Nicholson was de-
cided, caseworkers at ACS had a domestic violence protocol and assess-
ment tool in hand and received two full days of targeted domestic vio-
lence training. The training curriculum ACS used took an approach that
emphasized psychological dimensions of abuse, including women's pre-
sumed ambivalence about separating from violent partners, that bore
little relation to either the cutting edge definition of domestic violence as
a pattern or coercive and controlling tactics ACS adopted from Massa-
chusetts or to the criteria used in its protocol (also adopted from Massa-
chusetts) to assess the emergent nature of the problem.
9 Despite the lack
of coherent guidance provided to child protection staff, the training fairly
represented the existing state of knowledge in the field.
II. THE KNOWLEDGE BASE
The domestic violence field operates from what I term a "domestic
violence paradigm." This paradigm is built around four elements. The
first element is a definition of violence as a discrete act which causes or
is likely to cause injury; the second is the equation of abuse with inci-
dents of injurious or potentially injurious violence; and the third is an
assessment of severity according to a "calculus of harms"--the more
injury, the more serious the problem. The fourth element is a "victimiza-
tion narrative" that links domestic violence to various deficits in the vic-
tim, including a condition known as "learned helplessness" and an ability
to identify or utilize appropriate alternatives. The best known versions of
the victimization narrative are the models of "battered woman syn-
drome" or "post-traumatic stress disorder" that make up the heart of a
"battered woman's defense" widely used to represent women on trial for
assaulting or killing abusive partners.'0 Virtually every aspect of the
helping response we've devised for battered women is built from these
elements, including the definition of domestic violence as a crime, the
understanding of protection orders, the importance placed on "safety" by
our entire movement and the assessment tools we use to ration shelter,
9. For the CPS Model developed in Massachusetts, see Pamela Whitney & Lonna Davis,
Child Abuse and Domestic Violence in Massachusetts: Can Practice be Integrated in a Public Child
Welfare Setting?, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT No. 2, 158-66 (1999).
10. This stereotype is based on the now discredited view that battered women suffer from
"battered woman's syndrome" consisting of "learned helplessness" and a "cycle of violence" which
causes victims to be ambivalent about leaving. See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN 42-71 (1979); For a critique of this view, see generally DONALD DOWNS, MORE THAN
VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY AND THE LAW 3-16 (1996). Mary Ann
Dutton, Understanding Women's Response to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered
Women's Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191,1197-1201 (1993).
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medical care or police intervention. It was from this model that the ACS
training curriculum built its sympathetic portrait of battered mothers. Put
simply, it is generally assumed that battering consists of discrete, injuri-
ous assaults that can render victims incapable of acting effectively on
their own or their children's behalf. This view diverges dramatically
from what battered women actually experience in the vast majority of
cases. As a result, interventions based on the paradigm are largely un-
successful in ending abuse.
I will have more to say about this model momentarily. But two
points will help you anticipate where I am going. First, in contrast to the
paradigm, battered women report that abuse is typically "ongoing" rather
than comprised of discrete incidents and that in a majority of cases the
most salient elements involve forms of isolation, intimidation and control
rather than severe assault. Women's vulnerability to assault-and chil-
dren's as well-may be largely a function of these nonviolent con-
straints. Importantly, the basic harms inflicted by these "nonviolent"
forms of coercion and control are to women's basic liberties of move-
ment, association, speech and the like, rather than to their physical integ-
rity.1 As a consequence and in contrast to the victimization narrative,
although battered women evidence a greatly elevated risk compared to
nonbattered women for a range of medical, behavioral and psychological
problems, the vast majority of victims do not suffer from these problems.
This issue was critical to Nicholson because it suggested that battered
women were not like other women in the CPS caseload and required a
specialized response. The second point is that the punitive and unconsti-
tutional behaviors evidenced in Nicholson are the logical outcome when
this model is superimposed on the current statutory aim of CPS, even if
no other contributing factors are brought into the picture. In other
words, we need to assume nothing else to generate the actions of ACS in
Nicholson except that domestic violence creates an emergent situation
that effectively disables the protective capacities of mothers. Not only
does this view push certain actors (such as crisis managers, courts, shel-
ters and police) and responses to the fore; it also makes other possible
11. On abuse as ongoing, see Page-Hall Smith et al., Measuring Battering: Development of
the Women's Experience of Battering (WEB) Scale, WOMEN'S HEALTH, Winter 1995, at 273-88. On
the importance of isolation, intimidation and control, see John W. McCormack Graduate School of
Policy Studies Center for Social Policy, In Harm 's Way: Domestic Violence, AFDC Receipt, and
Welfare Reform in Massachusetts, (1997), at http://www.mccormack.umb.edu/csp/publications/
harms%20way.pdf Current controversies on defining nonlethal violence against women in intimate
heterosexual relationships, see Walter S. DcKcscrcdy, Current Controversies of Defining Nonlethal
Violence Against Women in Intimate Heterosexual Relationships: Empirical Implications, 6
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN No.7, 728-46 (2000); D.R. Follingstad et al., Factors Moderating
Physical and Psychological Symptoms of Battered Women, 6 J. FAM. VIOLENCE No. 1, 81-95 (1995);
M. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of Violence Against
Women, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 283, 283-94 (1995). M. Kasian et al., Frequency and Severity of
Psychological Abuse in a Dating Population, 7 J INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE No. 3, 350-64 (1992).
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responses to the parties involved (such as a response based on partnering
and emphasizing their strengths and resiliency) unlikely.
III. THE NEXUS OF RESEARCH AND POLITICS
Critical to Nicholson were three convergent processes: a growing
body of literature that applied the domestic violence paradigm to chil-
dren; 12 mounting political pressure for child protective services (CPS) to
intervene in so-called "dual victim" families-where both a mother and
child are put at risk by an abusive male; and a body of case law that ap-
plies the Failure to Protect Doctrine (under state neglect statutes) to non-
offending parents in these families.1 3  Following the presumption that
being "exposed" to domestic violence harms children, CPS and the
courts in many states, with New York as the leader, instituted a policy of
charging battered mothers with neglect and temporarily removing their
12. For a review of this literature, see PETER C. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATTERED
WOMEN 21 (1990), where it is estimated that 3.3 million American children are exposed to violent
incidents between parents. See also Wanda K. Mohr, Making the Invisible Victims of Domestic
Violence Visible, 2 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. (Civil Research Institute, Kingston, NJ.), Au-
gust/September 1997, No. 6, at 81: J.L. Edelson, Children's Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence,
14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE No. 8, 839-870 (1999); J.L. Edelson, The Overlap Between Child
Maltreatment and Woman Abuse, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 2, 1-6 (1999), available at
http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/VAWnetDocs/AR overlap.pdf. On-line re-
sources summarizing the literature include: National Women's Resource Center, Bibliography on
Children Who Witness Violence: Research & Intervention by J.L. Edelson, at
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/bibs/bibkids/bibkids.html. For estimates as high as ten
million, see K. Kracke, Children's Exposure to Violence: The Safe Start Initiative, (U.S. Department
of Justice), April 2000, No. 13, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ojjdp/fs200113.pdf. For
a summary of statutes, see Annelies Hagemeister, Overlap of Domestic Violence and Child Mal-
treatment in U.S.A. State Civil and Criminal Statutes, at http://www.mineava.umn.edu/link
documents/statutes/statutes.shtml. This April 2000 table lists statutes alphabetically by state. On
legal trends, see Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our Knowledge
of Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act, IA CURRENT PERSP.
PSYCHOL. LEGAL & ETHICAL ISSUES: CHILDREN & FAM.: ABUSE & ENDANGERMENT 197, 216
(1992); Anne Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail to Protect, 5 L. & INEQUALITY 359,
362-81 (1987); See State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780, 782 (N.C. 1982), Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d
614, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), and Fabritz v. Traurig, 583 F 2d 697, 699 (1978) where women were
charged because they failed to act to prevent children from being hurt or killed.
13. See Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth of
the Passive Battered Mother and the Protected Child in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1087, 1089 (1995); see also Evan Stark, A Failure to Protect: Unraveling The Battered Mother's
Dilemma, 27 W. ST. U. L. REv. 29, 59 (2000); The Failure to Protect Working Group, Charging
Battered Mothers With Failure to Protect: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 850
(2000). The best summary of this trend is Melissa A. Trepiccione, At The Crossroads of Law and
Social Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child An Acceptable
Solution When Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence? 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1522 (2001).
The critical case decisions in New York were In the Matter of Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Fam. Ct.
1992) (where a non-abusing battered mother was found neglectful for failing to protect her children
from sexual abuse by the father, even though the court acknowledged that she suffered from battered
woman's syndrome) and In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998) (where the court ruled
that by staying in the abusive relationship the mother had failed to exercise a minimum degree of
care). For examples of the argument that battered women's services should collaborate with CPS,
see Susan Schechter & Jeffrey Edleson, In the Best Interest of Women and Children: A Call for
Collaboration Between Child Welfare and Domestic Violence Constituencies, at
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/wingsp/wingsp.html, and Janet Carter, Domestic Violence,
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children if it was alleged that the children witnessed the violence or were
otherwise exposed to it.1 4 By re-victimizing battered women, these cases
raised acute dilemmas for those of us who had publicized the harm do-
mestic violence poses to children, urged CPS to provide safety enhancing
services to victimized mothers as well as children, and helped to train
CPS personnel.
The first piece of relevant background information is that, for at
least a decade prior to Nicholson, domestic violence researchers pro-
moted the idea that the connection between domestic violence and harms
to children was not only significant, but compelled protective interven-
tion.15
In one of the first studies of this connection, Dr. Anne Flitcraft and I
reviewed all the cases "darted" for suspicion of child abuse at Yale-New
Haven Hospital for a year. 16 Remarkably, we found that the mother had
also been abused in 45% of these cases. 7 A replication of this work at
Boston City Hospital's Pediatric Department reported that the mother
was battered in 60% of the child abuse cases.' 8 Data from CPS agencies
is less reliable because the proportion of cases where domestic violence
is identified depends on whether, and with what tools, screening for do-
mestic violence occurs, whether organizational culture supports interven-
tion, and whether the investigating agency is perceived as responsible for
adult as well as child safety. Despite differing estimates, ranging from a
low of 13% to 49%, evidence from CPS caseloads consistently highlights
the importance of domestic violence as a contextual factor for child mal-
treatment.' 9 Although estimates appear to increase if a domestic violence
protocol is in place and further still if questioning is routine, there is as
yet no "gold standard" to use as a baseline for performance.20 In part,
14. See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect Bat-
tered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229, 245-48 (1996) (explaining that
accusing battered mothers of neglect deprives them of control and further aggravates their prob-
lems).
15. Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective on
Child Abuse, 18 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES No.I, 97-98 (1988). For discussion of the service needs
in families where woman battering and child abuse coincide, see Sandra K. Beeman et al., Case
Assessment And Service Receipt In Families Experiencing Both Child Maltreatment And Woman
Battering, 16 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE No. 5,437-58 (2001). For examples of the argument that
battered women's services should collaborate with CPS, see Susan Schechter & Jeffrey Edleson, In
the Best Interest of Women and Children: A Call for Collaboration Between Child Welfare and
Domestic Violence Constituencies, at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/wingsp/wingsp.html,
and Janet Carter, Domestic Violence, ChildAbuse and Youth Violence: Strategies for Prevention and
Early Intervention, at http://www.mincava.urn.edu/link/documents/fvpf2/fvpf2.shtml.
16. Stark & Fliteraft, supra note 15, at 104.
17. Id.
18. Linda McKibben et al., Victimization of Mothers of Abused Children: A Controlled Study,
84 PEDIATRICS No. 3, 531-34 (1989).
19. Stark, supra note 2, at 109- 10.
20. SUSAN MITCHELL-HERZFELD, THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT (ASFA) STUDY
(2000) (unpublished report, on file with the The Evaluation & Research Unit of New York State's
Office of Children and Family Studies).
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this is because CPS workers are rarely accountable for identifying do-
mestic violence and CPS clients often fear that revealing domestic vio-
lence will jeopardize their parenting status or lead to an escalation of
abuse. One result is that a high proportion of the domestic violence cases
identified as such by CPS involve levels of injury that make reporting
unavoidable. Even the lowest incidence rates indicate that domestic vio-
lence is more often an issue in child protection cases than is substance
abuse, homelessness, mental illness or other comparable problems to
which considerably greater resources are devoted. Indeed, it is probably
the single most common context for child maltreatment.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL WEAKNESSES
Several things are notable about this research. The first is that it is
extremely weak methodologically. Most studies rely on small or unrep-
resentative samples, such as mothers in shelters, or on sources such as
population surveys where secondhand reports with no confirming evi-
dence are used to estimate prevalence rates. Substantial differences be-
tween the context, dynamics and consequences of child abuse and child
neglect have been widely noted. The mothers in Nicholson were charged
with neglect.21 But, the literature on how domestic violence harms chil-
dren typically focuses either on child abuse or on psychological or be-
havioral outcomes attributed to domestic violence rather than on neglect.
Conversely, there is virtually no data on "dosage" that would tell us
"how much" or what types of abuse are likely to harm children. Few use
comparison groups of children from nonviolent homes, differentiate vio-
lent families from high conflict or distressed families in which there is no
violence, assess children's strengths or coping responses, link test pro-
files that indicate deficits to actual malfunctions or control for such con-
founding factors as the disruptive effects of going to a shelter, develop-
mental age, exposure to community violence or other potentially trau-
matic life-experiences that may confound clinical measures of dysfunc-
tion. No attention has been paid to accompanying coercive or controlling
factors within the family that may affect children's reactions independ-
ently of violence. Moreover, studies that identify witnessing as the cause
of harm have rarely determined whether the children affected have also
been abused.22 Finally, virtually no studies have compared the actual
incidence of the behavioral problems that typically merit CPS interven-
tion among exposed children to baseline rates of these problems in the
general population or in foster care.
21. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
22. Stark, supra note 2, at 114.
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V. CONCEPTUAL FAILURE TO SHOW How DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HARMS
CHILDREN
Perhaps an even more important issue for our current discussion is
the consistent failure of researchers, including the range of advocates
who consulted with ACS, to conceptualize the widely documented "over-
lap" between domestic violence and harms to children's welfare. Of the
several hundred published studies on this connection, fewer than a hand-
ful even address, let alone go into detail about, the dynamics that actually
connect harms to mothers and children. A major explanation for the
inappropriate ACS response is that, although there is widespread pres-
sure for intervention in these cases, there are few conceptual maps to
help professionals who are statutorily responsible for children's safety
unravel the chain of causation in these cases or shape the evidence before
them into an intelligible and evidence based story to guide assessment,
judgment or intervention. As a defensive adaptation to this situation,
CPS agencies like ACS have relied heavily on blanket policies that in-
clude placement and accusations of "failure to protect" against abuse
victims as first-line interventions.
One scenario presumably needs no elaboration, where children are
directly injured during a partner assault. But we have no conclusive data
on this circumstance. When I looked at Connecticut data gathered by the
State Police, I found that children were considered "involved" in 17.6%
of the cases where at least one partner was arrested. 23 Yet, the harm al-
leged to the child justified a charge of "risk of injury" in only 441 of
15,060 incidents, fewer than 3%.24 An unpublished study of seventy-one
domestic violence cases, the New York State Office of Families and
Children reported that in three cases, children required outpatient medi-
cal treatment, slightly higher than the Connecticut figure. 5 To put these
figures in perspective, consider this: even if we assume all of the children
who required medical attention were "abused" and merited CPS inter-
vention, this is just slightly higher than the proportion of abuse found in
the general population (about 2.5%) and much less than the comparable
risk in foster families (about 5%).26 In other words, a generic policy of
placement in domestic violence cases would almost double the risk that a
child would be harmed.
We know some things about the dynamics when children are
harmed. In our Yale research, we determined that the typical abuser of
the children in these cases was the same man who was abusing their
23. 1999 CONN. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY ANN. REP. 4.
24. Id.
25. Mitchell-Herzfeld, supra note 20.
26. A report by the Public Advocate's Office in New York City identifies the overall risk of
child abuse in New York City as one in forty, about the same or only slightly less than the risk where
domestic violence occurs, and the risk in foster care as one in twenty, almost half again as high as
the risk posed by domestic violence. 2001 N.Y. PUB ADVOC. OFF. REP. 15.
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mother.2 7 Indeed that the fathers in abusive relationships were three
times more likely than fathers in non-abusive relationships to be respon-
sible for the harms to the children.28 But as a general rule, it has simply
been assumed that knowing the two events occur in some proximity-
that children are "exposed" and reveal possible problems on tests-is
sufficient to posit an "if/then" connection.
VI. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
One reason the "connection" was accepted so uncritically was be-
cause the women's advocacy community had been trying unsuccessfully
since the early 1970's to get the child welfare system to acknowledge the
importance of domestic violence for their clients. In 1985, when I pre-
sented the findings from our Yale studies and other evidence on the over-
lap at a national "Workshop on Violence as a Public Health Problem"
convened by Dr. Koop, the United States Surgeon General, the leaders
from the child welfare community in attendance responded with stone
silence. They saw no need to share the wealth with the battered women's
advocacy community, relatively new kids on the block, and feared that
identifying with an issue that smacked of "women's lib" could open a
political Pandora's Box.
Everything changed when Congress passed and President Clinton
signed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994.'9 Suddenly,
with a little over 1.2 billion in funds committed to domestic violence and
sexual assault, the battered women's movement was no longer marginal.
The phones started to ring. Funding for the Office of Maternal and Child
Health had been flat for a decade, I was told. Could they garner a por-
tion of VAWA if they recognized that "healthy" mothers also had to be
safe? Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), National
Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN) and other agen-
cies that had shown little interest in women except in their roles as child-
bearers and "mothers" were suddenly willing to hear about abuse. The
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has historically limited itself to re-
search. Yet, because they had climbed on the domestic violence wagon
early on, they got federal program dollars to dole out. The reauthoriza-
tion bills for CPS included grants to research and break the connection
between domestic violence and child maltreatment.
The lesson was clear. Our movement had changed the political con-
text in which agencies for women and children met. In hundreds of
communities, domestic violence services now sat at family violence
council meetings with local representatives from CPS. We had always
targeted CPS in our advocacy efforts, usually with little response. But
27. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 15, at 105-07.
28. Id. at 86.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2005).
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now we were in the limelight and they needed to catch up. So they in-
vited us to help train their workers, develop joint protocols, help explain
some of their more difficult cases and, yes, to join them in attempts to get
funds.
To understand the critical misstep that occurred next, put yourselves
in the shoes of these parties. Try to imagine what the battered women's
movement and CPS bring to the table or take away. The advocates came
armed with research showing the overlap-our clients are also yours,
they told CPS. From the advocacy standpoint, the more dramatic the
claims, the more useful. Since virtually all children in homes where their
mothers are being abused are likely to be "exposed" in some way, it did
not seem like too much of a stretch to generalize from the increased risk
for a number of problems associated with "witnessing" to the generic
risk faced by all children in homes where domestic violence occurred. It
is hard to fault the advocacy community for accepting on its face what
the research community presented, particularly since it confirmed what
we wanted to believe. So, we talked about harms and "witnessing" and
"exposure" and left the rest to the imagination of a CPS workforce sea-
soned on the worst sort of family dysfunctions.
What is the CPS caseworker or a supervisor hearing? She is statuto-
rily responsible for protecting children (not mothers). Now, she is told
that when she sees domestic violence, there is high probability a child
will suffer. Moreover, either for dramatic effect or because they don't
know any better, the advocates are emphasizing injurious violence, as if
this was the modal situation. This image rings true to CPS. Because
they rarely ask about domestic violence routinely, have no mandate to
protect women, lack the support needed to intervene appropriately and
are widely distrusted by the mothers in their caseload, CPS rarely see
cases until the violence becomes extreme, a situation that reinforces their
mistaken belief that any real case of battering constitutes an "emer-
gency." This is the woman with the blackened eye that caseworkers see
on Television and on the posters hung at Marshall's during Domestic
Violence Month.
The myth linking woman battering to physical injury was one of the
hardest to dispel during the Nicholson case. Again, my own research is
relevant here. In the Yale Trauma Studies, Dr. Flitctraft and I found that
battered women were at a much higher risk for injury than non-battered
women: if a woman presents with an injury to the hospital, it is more
likely to have been caused by a partner than by any other cause, includ-
ing auto accidents, widely believed to be the most common cause of in-
jury to women under sixty-five. 30 But even in the ER, only a tiny pro-
30. Shirley A. Wiegand, Deception and Artifice: Thelma, Louise, and the Legal Hermeneutic,
22 OKLA. CirY U. L. REv. 25, 43 (1997). On injury, homicide, suicidality and other health and
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portion of victims require hospitalization. In fact, depending on whether
we look at emergency medical data, police data, or general population
surveys, no significant injury occurs in an estimated 98% of all domestic
violence incidents.31
Enter Ms. Nicholson. In the target incident, the father of her daugh-
ter arrived at the apartment in a jealous rage, threw objects throughout
the house, then kicked and severely beat Sharwline, breaking 
her arm.32
Ms. Tillet, another plaintiff, was also badly beaten by her estranged hus-
band.33 Both women had separated from their abusive partners.
34 Ms.
Tillet had been assaulted before, but this was the first domestic violence
incident against Ms. Nicholson.35 None of their children witnessed the
abuse. 36 But this information made little difference to ACS largely be-
cause all the caseworkers saw was the "emergency" created by the vio-
lence and the mother's incapacity to take the steps needed to protect her-
self or her children. In many instances, the caseworkers were insensitive
as well as over-worked and underpaid; the lawyers involved were ill-
trained and often as dismissive of the caseworkers as of the mothers
whom they charged. Supervisors were often conspicuously negligent. In
this, the employees at ACS were no different than employees at any
comparable public agency or private service. To reiterate: to understand
ACS's response we need to know little more than how they understood
abuse and in what policy context this understanding took shape.
mental health problems, see EVAN STARK & ANNE FLITCRAFT, WOMEN AT RISK: DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE AND WOMEN'S HEALTH 99-150 (1996).
31. For police data on injury, see 1999 CONN. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY ANN. REP. 7, showing that
adult victims require treatment in about 3% of the cases. Medical data is summarized in CLAIRE M.
RENZETTI ET AL., SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 345-71 (2000). For general
population data showing approximately 2% of domestic violence incidents cause injury, see Warren
H. Pearse et al., The Commonwealth Fund Survey of Women's Health, 10 WOMEN's HEALTH ISSUES
No.1, 35-38 (2000).
32. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 169. Ms. Nicolson first became a victim of domestic vio-
lence one winter afternoon while her infant daughter was asleep and her son was in school. Id.
Claude Bamett, the father of her daughter Destinee, arrived at her apartment in a jealous rage. Id.
While throwing objects throughout the house, he kicked, beat and severely assaulted Sharwline,
injuring her head with his gun and leaving her with a broken arm. Id Sharwline remained overnight
in the hospital while her cousin cared for the children. Id. Though separated from Claude, and never
before a victim of domestic violence, child welfare workers had police removed six-year-old Kendall
and baby Destinee from Sharwline's cousin. Id at 170. Sharwline was charged with neglect, even
though her children had not witnessed domestic violence prior to or during the incident. Id. at 171.
33. Id. at 180. Sharlene Tillet was not a first time victim of domestic violence. Id. While
pregnant with her second child, she separated from her baby's father and purchased a plane ticket to
relocate to California to protect herself from further abuse. Id. Before she left, however, he beat her
one night in her apartment. Id. After Sharlene gave birth to her son Uganda, a hospital social worker
routinely questioned her about any history of domestic violence. Id. Sharlene honestly responded,
the case was reported to ACS and the supervisor instructed the caseworker to remove the baby "if
the boyfriend is still in the picture." Id. at 180-81. When Ms. Tillet agreed to let the boyfriend drive
her home from the hospital, hoping not to make a scene, child welfare caseworkers and police offi-
cers removed her newborn from her custody. Id.
34. Trepiccione, supra note 3, at 1487.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1488.
2005] NICHOLSON: WHEN GOOD PEOPLE DO BAD THINGS 703
VII. WHY PUNISH MOTHERS?
If this framework explains why ACS defined the cases in Nicholson
as requiring an emergency response and why they felt it was not possible
to work with the battered mothers, we have yet to explain an important
aspect of the case, the decision to respond by charging the mothers with
neglect rather than, for instance, removing or charging the fathers, the
alternative we preferred.
A significant facet of the explanation for the punitive response by
ACS is the legendary gender bias that drives CPS. The role of bias will
become clearer momentarily, when we look at how the view of women
has changed over the last century in the child welfare system. Child wel-
fare services have the propensity to treat women almost exclusively
through their maternal role; to offer services which heavily emphasize
helping women to become better mothers rather than to find jobs or se-
cure housing; and the treatment of fathers or father-surrogates as if they
were invisible. For example, in New York, Connecticut and many other
states, child welfare cases are classified in the mother's name even if she
is dead. Moreover, even though men commit a higher proportion of seri-
ous and fatal child abuse than women, I am unaware of a single program
in the United States that specifically provides parenting skills for abusive
dads. Racial bias was another contributing factor. The proportion of
African-Americans in the CPS caseload is vastly disproportionate to their
proportion in the population as a whole.37 CPS workers routinely intrude
in the lives of poor and minority women, and then demand that they
jump through hoops to prove their worthiness as persons, in ways that
they, let alone their middle-class neighbors, would not tolerate for a mo-
ment. All of these factors played a role in Nicholson.
Given its historical tendency to define mothers as its clients, but not
fathers, once CPS determined to treat exposure to domestic violence as
an emergent situation requiring removal, the third background factor
followed-the application of the failure to protect and neglect doctrines
to non-offending parents. We are aware of how damaging these prac-
tices could be, in part, because your own Professor Miccio had fought so
hard to call our attention to them.
A personal note may be relevant here. My interest in the Nicholson
case was the direct outgrowth of the sense of disappointment and respon-
sibility I felt because the work we had done as researcher/advocates was
being used against the very people that we had hoped it would help. We
had naively assumed that once the information about domestic violence
and children was presented to the child welfare system, it would be
automatically translated into the sorts of practice we favored, enhanced
37. Ana M. Novoa, Count the Brown Faces: Where is the "Family" in the Family Law of
Child Protective Services, I SCHOLAR 5, 8-9 (1999).
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advocacy for battered mothers, accountability for abusive men and
greater safety and support for all victimized parties. That the opposite
occurred made us appreciate that any information we provided on the
misfortunes of women would be downsized and inverted to fit within a
very narrow purview of the child protection mission. One obvious con-
clusion from this realization is that the child protection mission must
change.
A final point before we move on is how deeply divided the advo-
cacy community remains about where the responsibility of the abusive
partner ends and the responsibility of the victimized mothers for harms
suffered by children begins. Since both Ms. Nicholson
38 and Ms. Tillet39
were taken by surprise, they can hardly be held accountable for the sup-
posed "exposure" of their children. In any case, their children did not
directly witness the violence and there was no evidence they were
harmed.4n
But what if Ms. Nicholson or Ms. Tillet had refused to separate
from their abusive partners or had returned to an abusive relationship as
Ms. Tillet was falsely suspected of doing? Should they then be held ac-
countable? Given its long-term commitment to the belief that domestic
violence automatically harms children, even when the facts of the
Nicholson case became clear, there were still some leading advocates
who hesitated to condemn ACS' behavior. In part this was because so
many leaders in the advocacy movement are deeply invested in the belief
that CPS can be turned around if only the proper training is provided or
the proper formula developed to mix domestic violence and child protec-
tion services. In part, a deep ambivalence remains about whether even
being physically abused-particularly if the injuries are not life-
threatening--can reduce the enormous responsibility we place on women
as default caretakers.
This was illustrated by the response among some feminists to the
tragic murder of Lisa Steinberg by Joel Steinberg. Despite the fact that
Mr. Steinberg had so brutalized his live-in partner, Hedda Nussbaum, she
had to literally crawl out of the apartment to get help with a ruptured
spleen, the ambivalence towards Hedda felt by many in the women's
movement was illustrated in Waverly Place, a semi-fictionalized account
of Lisa's murder by Susan Brownmiller, a feminist pioneer in the anti-
rape movement, that sharply condemned the character based on Ms.
Nussbaum.4' Whatever else may motivate such attitudes, they are rooted
to a large extent in a misconception of what actually goes on in abusive
38. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 168-73.
39. Id. at 180-81.
40. Trepiccione, supra note 13, at 1488.
41. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, WAVERLY PLACE (Grove Press I st ed. 1989).
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relationships. This is the issue to which I want to turn now in more de-
tail.
VIII. FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TO COERCIVE CONTROL
I have already suggested that the dominant paradigm provides an
inadequate frame for understanding the battered women experience and
provided some factual data to contradict the equation of abuse with inci-
dents of severe violence. To reiterate, the vast majority of abusive inci-
dents involve pushes, shoves, slaps, hair-pulling and numerous other acts
that are unlikely to cause injury and are relatively trivial from a medical
or criminal justice standpoint. Some critics of the battered women's
movement, and most notably NYU Law and Social Work Professor
Linda Mills, take evidence that most domestic violence is minor to mean
we have exaggerated the seriousness of the problem and that it should be
decriminalized.42 This is not my position. What I am suggesting is that
our understanding of why domestic violence is serious is flawed. While
violent incidents can create a life-threatening emergency, the greatest
danger to all involved is a function of the frequency of abusive episodes
and their cumulative effect on women's safety and decision-making.
About 40% of all battering cases involve "serial" abuse, for instance,
where violence occurs several times a week and it is by no means un-
usual in my caseload for women to report hundreds, even thousands of
assaultive incidents over many years.43
One implication of this is that if we wait for an injury before we ask
about or identify domestic violence, we will miss more than ninety per-
cent of all incidents and probably enter a case when a victim's options
are already severely constrained. Another implication of taking the his-
tory of abusive violence seriously is that the fear or psychological prob-
lems we see are the cumulative outcome of multiple episodes, not of the
immediate effect of a particular incident. This is important because it is
easy to think that a victim is exaggerating the danger she is in or the de-
gree of oppression she faces when we measure her reaction by the level
of harm caused by a particular incident. Conversely, if there is no previ-
ous history of abuse and there is no other reason to believe the assailant
continues to pose a danger, there may be no emergency risk to the
woman, let alone to her child, even if the presenting incident is severe.
44This was the situation with Ms. Nicholson. Without an historical un-
derstanding and belief violence itself constitutes the emergency, CPS
both underestimates what is needed in cases where violence is ongoing
but not currently severe and exaggerates the risk posed to Ms. Nichol-
42. See generally Linda Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Ahuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REv. 550, 551-613 (1999).
43. 1984 U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. REP. 1.
44. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
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son, where the serious assault is not part of a pattern.45 At present, agen-
cies like ACS take the worst possible approach to these cases, failing to
identify the first as requiring supportive services and considering the
latter an "emergency" in which there is insufficient time to conduct a
careful assessment of needs, partner with victims to devise a safety-plan
or to provide enhanced advocacy with the criminal justice system.
There is another unfortunate consequence of the violence-based, in-
cident-specific definition of abuse that bears mentioning now, because it
profoundly affects the calculations women make about how to protect
themselves. Like CPS, the criminal law views domestic violence as in-
cident specific. So do the courts. In most jurisdictions today, domestic
violence incidents are treated alongside traffic offenses, most cases are
dismissed or nollied-80% or more in my own state of Connecticut, for
instance and almost no one goes to jail for any significant length of
time.4 6 I estimate that, even with mandatory and pro-arrest policies in
place nationwide, the chance that a man will go to jail for any given do-
mestic violence incident is about four in ten thousand or just a little bet-
ter than the chance of winning the lottery. Again, this has less to do with
police or court bias than with the law's failure to grasp the cumulative
significance of what is typically an ongoing course of assaultive conduct,
much like harassment or stalking.
So consider what it means when the same court system that threat-
ens to remove a woman's children because she has exposed them to an
abusive partner also tells her, if only by example, that they will not pun-
ish a man who has assaulted her dozens, perhaps hundreds of times. This
discrepancy between what batterers do and what the CPS, justice and
court system define as the domestic violence crime explains the tortured
machinations though which battered women strive to end or minimize or
manage the abuse. When Ms. Tillet bought a plane ticket to California to
protect herself from further abuse or agreed to let her boyfriend drive her
home from the hospital rather than make a scene, she was selecting ways
to minimize future abuse that were likely to be more effective than any
other option currently available to her.47 In several cases that came be-
fore the NRC, ACS charged mothers with neglect for not getting or not
personally serving protection orders. The expectation that women will
follow certain steps--even if there is no evidence these steps are likely to
be more effective than other steps-is a common foundation for punitive
responses to battered mothers.
45. See id. at 169.
46. 1991 CONN. ST. POLICE ANN. REP. 4.
47. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81.
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IX. A TYPOLOGY OF ABUSE
A second piece of "new" knowledge is that not all battering is the
same.
For many years, domestic violence researchers puzzled over the fact
that the portrait of domestic violence that emerged from population sur-
veys differed markedly from the portrait we got from crime surveys or
from the points-of-service where women sought help. For example,
more than 100 population-based studies now show women and men are
equally prone to use force to settle their differences in relationships and
that the use of force is "mutual" in almost half of these situations. 4 By
contrast, both crime surveys and research conducted in hospitals, court
settings or shelters show that battering is overwhelmingly a male crime
committed against female partners.49 One explanation was that men and
women were equally violent, but that the greater severity of male vio-
lence explained why women (but not men) showed up in the ER, called
police and considered their partner's use of force a "crime." This ac-
count was not satisfying, however, since, as I've indicated, the vast ma-
jority of incidents reported to helping services do not involve injury.
Another response was for the researchers on different sides of this debate
to attack one another as biased or to fault the methods used in various
studies. The discrepancies in the data were serious because, among other
things, they made it impossible to agree on incidence or prevalence fig-
ures and so made it impossible to determine the need for services or
whether interventions were working.
A sociologist, Michael Johnson, helped resolve the dispute by mak-
ing a point that should have been obvious-that the surveys were picking
up a very different population than the battered women who came for
help. 50 What is increasingly clear is that force is used in at least three
distinctive ways by partners, in "fights," in "assaults" and as part of a
pattern that includes tactics to intimidate, isolate and control a partner,
the pattern I term "coercive control." Each of these situations poses dif-
ferent types and levels of risk to children and a nuanced assessment that
hopes to provide appropriate interventions should take this into account.
X. COMMON COUPLE VIOLENCE
The most common use of force in couples is what Johnson terms
"common couple violence."51 In these situations, which are basically
48. An overview of this work is provided by Murray Sraus, Physical Assault by Women: A
Major Social Problem, (1997), at http://pubpages.unh.edu/-mas2/VB33.pdf.
49. This work is summarized in DEMI Kuaz, Physical Assault by Husbands: A Major Social
Problem, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 88-103 (Richard Gelles & Donileen
Loescke eds., 199 1).
50. M. Johnson, Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of Vio-
lence Against Women, J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 57, 290 (1995).
51. Id.
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akin to what most people would call "fights," one or both partners use
force to address a situational issue or difference of opinion or to express
feelings of frustration or anger. Women appear as likely to use force in
this context as men. But typically, neither party considers the use of
force illegitimate, injury is rare and outside help is rarely called for or
required. Interestingly, unlike the classic domestic violence situation, the
use of force appears to decline in these relationships over time and some
studies even suggest that couples that engage in this sort of fighting may
be more stable and more "satisfied" with their relationship than couples
where force is not used.
Of course, wherever children are present when force is used, they
can be harmed. Whatever our moral views about the use of violence,
however, it is important to understand that in inner-city communities
where there may be fewer resources than elsewhere that allow people to
settle their differences without violence, the use of force is commonly
understood as a conflict resolution strategy, i.e., a way to reduce serious
violence. In my son's high school, if you didn't fight when you were
called out, whether you were a boy or a girl, you ate your lunch in the
bathroom. And if you did fight, even if you were beaten up, there was
far less chance that you would be picked on afterwards than if you did
not. Many of the women I see take this attitude into their relationships
and believe, rightly or wrongly, that fighting for what they want is the
only way to get even a semblance of equality. Children also learn this
value on the street and in school as well as in their homes. But there is
no evidence whatsoever that these situations threaten children to any
substantial degree. I am not defending this particular use of force among
partners. But I hope that even those of you who believe that any expo-
sure of children to fighting can harm them will recognize that institu-
tional intervention to "protect" children in these circumstances is intru-
sive to the extreme, not to say an unconstitutional violation of privacy
rights.
XI. DOMESTIC ASSAULT
The second context in which force is used by partners involves
"domestic violence." This situation involves the unilateral use of force
to hurt a partner or their children, often in response to jealousy, in the
context of drug or alcohol use, and/or as part of a broad pattern of crimi-
nal activity. Domestic assault may extend to child abuse, inadvertently
hurt children, or be psychologically traumatic. Since this form of domes-
tic violence is rarely accompanied by strategies designed to subordinate
the partner, however, victims who are assaulted in this context typically
retain their psychological integrity, primarily require criminal justice
intervention, and are ready allies in safety planning for children. Women
frequently commit domestic assaults as well as men and with much the
[Vol. 82:4
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same motive, though they are significantly more likely to be injured than
male partners.
52
Unlike fights, these assaults rarely grow out of conflicts or dis-
agreements and are often designed to suppress conflict rather than to
resolve it. Moreover, these assaults appear to increase in frequency and
severity over time and victims are far more likely to define them as ille-
gitimate or as crimes and to seek outside assistance. Domestic assaults
where violence is the sole or principal element of abuse probably consti-
tute somewhere around 50-60% of the cases in which women primarily
(but not exclusively) seek help. 53 Emotional abuse is a common element
in these cases, but rarely are victims kept from key activities in their
lives, such as working, caring for their children, going to school or so-
cializing with friends or family. Although we may not fully empathize
with women who do so, some women in my practice "accept" assault in
their relationships, usually because they believe that the alternative, leav-
ing the partner permanently or making the violence the focus of their
lives, will do more to disrupt their life-plans or their parenting, than sim-
ply trying to minimize the harms caused. Such women should be fully
apprised of the risks their decisions pose to children.
Applying a calculus of harms to the means and consequences of
domestic assault is a good way to judge its severity and its potential to
harm children. Rarely do these situations present an emergency requir-
ing removal, let alone removal without a court order. At the same time,
if violence is severe, as it was against Ms. Nicholson, children can be
deprived of significant caretaking by their mother for varying lengths of
time and so require alternative care-taking arrangements (as Ms. Nichol-
son recognized) and, in extreme cases where alternatives within the fam-
ily or kin network are unavailable, even temporary placement outside
this network. Because the psychological and physical risks to children in
placement can be as great, or greater, than allowing them to remain in
situations where protections are unsure, the balance of harms is a critical
piece to be worked out jointly with the non-offending parent.
The appropriate steps in such cases are to have the father or father
surrogate removed from the home if the victim so desires, provide the
enhanced advocacy with criminal justice needed to protect the family and
offer the family appropriate resources (such as shelter or alternative
housing if needed) to support them. Because the autonomy and parent-
ing capacities of primary caretakers is unlikely to be seriously compro-
mised by domestic assault, CPS is obligated to develop safety or other
52. See Kurtz, supra note 49, at 88-103.
53. Among men arrested for domestic violence crimes in Quincy, Mass., 38. 1% admitted they
had prevented their partners from freely coming and going in their daily routine, 58.5% said they
denied their partners access to money and other resources and almost half reported restricting their
partners in three or more additional ways. E_ Buzawa et al., Response to Domestic Violence in a Pro-
Active Court Setting: Final Report, (1999), at http://www.ncjrs.orglpdffiles1/nij/grants/1 81428.pdf.
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plans for the children in these situations with the full partnership of the
non-offending parcnt. This strategy differs markedly from the approach
we saw so often in Nicholson and which is commonplace in the rest of
the country, namely where mothers are mandated into services, charged
with "neglect" if they refuse a service option (such as going to a shelter
or securing a protection order) provided by the caseworker or a pressured
into "voluntary" placement agreements by the threat of removal. Impor-
tantly, women may also be pressured in these ways by battered women's
shelters. Partnering is particularly important in the present context,
where there is only a small likelihood that protection orders or even
criminal charges on their own will result in more than a temporary cessa-
tion of abuse.
XII. CAN CASE WORKERS PARTNER WITH ABUSED WOMEN?
Before turning to the third context in which force is used, I would
like to briefly address another misconception widely made about battered
women in the CPS caseload, that even if they are not disabled by the
violence, their parenting capacities are nonetheless compromised by the
secondary or indirect affects of abuse on their psychological functioning.
As we've seen, this too is a basic tenet of the paradigm.
In Nicholson, we assessed this issue from two vantage points. First,
we asked whether violence impaired women's parenting capacity as
such. Second, we compared rates of problems often linked to impair-
ment among battered and non-battered mothers within the CPS caseload.
Despite evidence that some proportion of battered women experience
moderate to severe symptoms of depression, post-traumatic stress disor-
ders or other mental health or behavioral problems, there is no evidence
that their capacity to parent is compromised as a result. To the contrary,
even among the most severely abused, only a small minority of abused
women require shelter, and the vast majority exhibit unimpaired capaci-
ties to parent. Evidence of this comes from a recent study, authored by
Chris Sullivan, of battered women in shelters.
5 4
Utilizing multi-variant techniques, Sullivan and her colleagues con-
cluded "a mother's experience of physical and emotional abuse had no
direct impact on their level of parenting stress or use of discipline with
their children., 55 Both by their own and their children's reports, the vast
majority of mothers in this study were emotionally available to their
children (ninety-eight percent), continued to value parenting (ninety-one
percent), and provided appropriate supervision and discipline (ninety-one
percent), typically using timeouts, grounding and taking away privi-
54. Chris M. Sullivan et al., Beyond Searching for Deficits: Evidence that Physically and
Emotionally Abused Women are Nurturing Parents, 2 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE, 61-62 (2000).
55. Id.
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leges.5 6 Seventy-three percent of the battered mothers reported spanking
or slapping their children, though only fifty-eight percent of the children
reported ever being spanked or slapped.57 Whatever one may think about
the proportion of battered mothers who employ corporal punishment,
however, it is actually smaller than the comparable proportion among
American parents generally. 58 Perhaps the most telling findings are that
children of battered mothers in battered women shelters reported rela-
tively high and stable scores on their self-concept across time, and exhib-
ited overall adjustment that fell within the range of what is considered
normal.5 9
Even if Sullivan and her colleagues are correct in concluding that
battered women retain their capacity to parent, a more critical problem is
whether they are hindered-and their children put at risk-because they
develop a range of problems commonly associated with neglect in the
CPS population such as substance abuse or mental illness. In the Yale
Trauma Studies, for instance, Dr. Flitcraft and I found that battered
women in the hospital population had significantly higher rates of a
range of behavioral and mental health problems than non-battered
women. 60 Indeed, they were nine times more likely to abuse drugs, fif-
teen times more likely to abuse alcohol and far more likely to have a
"psychotic break," report depression, and to have attempted suicide.
61
Since these problems only became disproportionate after the onset of
abuse, they had clearly developed in the context and as a response to
battering and could not be its cause.
Even in the trauma sample, battered women were statistically much
more likely to present these problems than non-battered women, how-
ever, the vast majority of battered women did not, in fact, develop these
problems.62 Still, we expected that the multi-problem profile we found
among battered women in the emergency room would be replicated
among the battered mothers we identified in the study of children
"darted" for abuse. To our surprise, however, we found that the battered
mothers of abused or neglected children were much less likely than non-
victimized mothers to have histories that included disproportionate rates
of alcohol or drug abuse, mental illness, sexual abuse or violence in
childhood.63 In fact, we found that the population of "darted" children
could be basically divided into two subgroups, "neglected" children with
56. Id. at 65-66.
57 Id.
58. Over 90% of American parents report spanking their children, and the overwhelming
majority support the practice. M.A. Straus, Discipline and Deviance: Physical Punishment of Chil-
dren and Violence and Other Crime in Adulthood, 38 SOC. PROBS. 133, 136 (1991).
59. Sullivan, supra note 54, at 51-71.
60. Id.
61. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 30, at 12.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 30.
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multi-problem mothers (there was little data on fathers) who often came
from multi-problem families-of-origin and children who were being
"abused," usually by the same man who was assaulting their mothers.64
The results of our work at Yale were supported by the AFSA study of
CPS cases in New York City cited earlier. This study found that caretak-
ers who were not victims of domestic violence were almost one hundred
percent more likely to be identified with abusing drugs (19.4% - 11.3%)
or both alcohol and drugs (2.0% vs. 1.4%).65 By contrast, fully eighty-
four and one half percent of the domestic violence victims had no mental
health problems.
66
How should we explain these seemingly contradictory findings, that
battering causes a range of problems among victims and yet, within the
CPS population, these victims look considerably better from a psycho-
logical or behavioral standpoint than other clients? The explanation is
that battered mothers comprise a distinct population within the CPS
caseload because they enter the caseload almost exclusively because of
what their partner has done to them, not because of psychological or
behavioral problems that place their children at risk. Within the multi-
problem CPS caseload, they typically present as high functioning and
capable parents who are relatively problem free.
This information is particularly important in understanding the
wrongs committed by ACS in Nicholson. ACS charged the Nicholson
mothers with "neglect" despite the fact that there was no evidence of
"neglect" in the classic sense and this was a population that did not re-
semble the typical population of neglectful mothers in any sense.67 The
battered mothers in Nicholson present a need for help in the CPS popula-
tion that flows directly from their victimization and from no other
source. Though emergent psychiatric care or mental health counseling
for symptoms related to trauma may be occasionally required by these
women, typical needs include economic resources, shelter and other
housing options, as well as enhanced advocacy-particularly with the
criminal justice and court systems. As importantly, given the evidence
that their parenting skills are typically unimpaired by battering, parenting
classes are rarely required or appropriate and may send the unintended
message that the woman, not her abuser, is responsible for her victimiza-
tion. Yet these are precisely the "services" to which battered mothers
were referred or mandated. Finally, the fact that the vast majority of the
battered mothers in the CPS caseload are psychologically and behavior-
ally "normal," at least in a statistical sense, eliminates the usual rationale
given by CPS for not treating clients as equals and making them full
64. Stark & Flitcrafl, supra note 15, at 105.
65. See Mitchell-Herzfeld, supra note 20.
66, See id
67. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 171.
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partners in service planning. Clearly too, based on this data, there is no
rationale whatsoever for considering placement as a first-line option.
XIII. COERCIVE CONTROL
The third context in which force is used by partners involves coer-
cive control, where physical assault is complemented by a pattern of in-
timidation, isolation and control.
When we opened the first shelters in the 1970's, women told us re-
peatedly "the violence isn't the worst part." Because we had learned in
working with rape victims that violence is hard to talk about, we redi-
rected those who said this to "talk about the violence." Now, almost
thirty years later, we have come to realize that the most devastating con-
text for battering is when minor physical abuse is embedded in a pattern
that deprives women of basic rights and resources, exploits them sexu-
ally and often monetarily, isolates them from friends, family, profession-
als and other potential sources of support, and implements a regime of
regulation over everyday affairs. In study after study, we are now find-
ing-because we are asking for the first time-that varying majorities of
abusers are taking their partners money, denying them food, monitoring
their going and coming, prohibiting their use of the phone, forcing them
to check in or out, limiting their access to work, school or church, moni-
toring their time and relationships and so forth. I don't have time to
document these findings here but only to introduce you to the phenome-
non.
To some extent, this regime of control resembles the situation of
hostages, victims of kidnapping or indentured servants. But there are
three critical differences that define what legal scholar Elizabeth Schnei-
der calls the "particularity" of abuse. 68 First, because of the presumption
of intimacy, the abusive partner has access not only to the victim, but to
knowledge about her personal life and her children's lives that allows
him to manipulate her in ways that are particularly threatening to her. He
knows her illegal activity, whether she uses illicit drugs or is stealing
from work or is occasionally leaving her nine year old home alone with a
twelve year old. He knows that she was sexually abused by an uncle
who hid from her in a family closet. So he plays this game when he
wants to teach her a lesson. This combination of intimate knowledge and
continued access is the most serious facet of battering in terms of
women's decision-making.
Secondly, these forms of control operate across social space. I
mean this literally. A common element in coercive control is the use of
means to track and regulate victim behavior when the couple is sepa-
68. Elizabeth M. Schnieder, Particularity and Generality: Challenges Of Feminist Theory
And Practice In Work On Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 527-28 (1992).
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rated, through beepers, tracking devices or other forms of surveillance
for instance, when she is at work or shopping or in the car. This aspect
of coercive control makes separation largely ineffective as a means of
freeing herself from abuse.
The third particular element of coercive control is the extent to
which regulatory tactics target women's everyday behavior and particu-
larly those behaviors associated with stereotypic gender roles. We are
talking here about how they dress, clean, cook, drive, care for the chil-
dren and so forth. Nor is coercive control only a problem in the most
extreme cases of abuse. Instead, there is growing evidence that at least
some of these restrictions are present in a majority of the instances where
women seek help with abuse. Coercive control currently has no legal
standing.
We are only beginning to get a handle on coercive control and what
its presence implies for children's welfare or CPS practice. The major
risks to children involve attempts to deprive the primary caretaker of
support and resources needed for basic survival, including food, money
or access to transportation. It is already apparent that coercive control
has several important implications for how we intervene in battering.
First, the presence of coercive control shifts the focus of under-
standing from the psychological effects of abuse to the objective parame-
ters of exploitation and deprivation. While mothers subjected to coercive
control may experience a range of medical, behavioral or psychological
problems, the risk of neglect in these cases is typically a direct result of
the constraints under which she is living, not an incapacity or inability to
provide or protect. In the presence of coercive control, there is no need
to posit a psychological dependence or even an investment in maintain-
ing the relationship to understand why it is so difficult for victims to af-
fect a permanent separation. This also shifts attention from "why women
stay?" to how to effectively limit the access of a controlling partner to his
partner and her children. Conversely, the range of interventions that
focus on self-esteem or parenting issues would seem to be largely irrele-
vant if the major problem in the household is that the woman's decision-
making has been usurped by being denied money and regulated in her
everyday behaviors. Until the law clearly recognizes coercive control as
a course of conduct and liberty crime, however, it is not clear how inter-
vention should proceed.
At the same time, secondly, coercive control is often hard to see,
largely because it builds so heavily on the constraints on women's be-
havior they inherit with their role as default homemakers, caretakers and
sex objects. For example, if women are expected to clean and cook, it is
hard to discern what difference it makes that there are "rules" in the
household for how high the bedspread must be above the rug or how and
when dinner is to be served. We assume that "men" make the major
financial decisions in a household. So the fact that a man takes the
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woman's paycheck, freely uses her money card or goes through her
pocket for spare change to support his gambling or drug habit may not
seem like anything more than a "bad" luck extension of business as
usual, not behavior we would encourage certainly, but also not behavior
we would automatically link to abuse. Victims too are often confused
about what label to place on coercive control. Subtle steps often link
what feel like expressions of "love" such as being told he likes her hair a
certain way or that she shouldn't go to a certain club or to hang out with
certain friends to buying her clothes, not letting her shop by herself, or
drive, or talk on the phone, or see these friends. Although these prohibi-
tions are almost always backed up by the implication "or else...." vio-
lence may be minimal in these relationships or may become so routine it
appears, or even feels normal. The fact that coercive control relies so
heavily on enforcing traditional gender roles-what I term "sexism with
a vengeance"--contributes to its invisibility. So does the fact that coer-
cive control is so alien to the experience of the vast majority of men.
In addition to the direct risks children face in cases involving simple
domestic violence or coercive control, they are also endangered by two
common patterns, "the battered mother's dilemma" and when child abuse
occurs as "tangential spouse abuse."
XIV. THE BATTERED MOTHER'S DILEMMA
The battered mother's dilemma refers to the choices the offender
forces the victim to make between their own safety and the safety of their
children. A particular incident may bring this dilemma into sharp focus,
as when a woman realizes that she may be hurt or killed if she attempts
to protect her child from an offender's abuse. In a case in which I testi-
fied, for example, a woman whose life had been threatened returned to
her house and was killed when her husband took their eighteen month
old child "hostage. 69
Typically, however, the battered mother's dilemma describes an
ongoing facet of abusive relationships where the offending partner re-
peatedly forces a victimized caretaker to choose between taking some
action she believes is wrong (such as physically disciplining her child),
being hurt herself, or standing by while he hurts the child. Threatening
to hurt the primary caretaker if she reports domestic violence or child
abuse is a classic instance of the battered mother's dilemma. Confronted
with these dilemmas, victims attempt to preserve their rationality and
humanity by selecting the least dangerous option, a decision-making
process I term "control in the context of no control." It is the responsi-
bility of CPS or the police to redress the imbalance in power from which
this dilemma arises, thereby increasing the choices available to the vic-
tim. Ignorance of the external constraints to which a caretaker is re-
69. State v. Traficonda, 612 A.2d 45, 47 (Conn. 1992).
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sponding, however, often leads agencies to mistakenly hold her culpable
and respond punitively, thereby aggravating rather than rclieving the
dilemma.
XV. CHILD ABUSE AS TANGENTIAL SPOUSE ABUSE
A related but separate dynamic occurs when child abuse appears as
"tangential spouse abuse." Here, the offender treats the child as an ex-
tension of the mother, and threatens or harms the child to increase the
mother's dependence, compliance and/or fear. Child abuse as tangential
spouse abuse is particularly common during separation and divorce,
when the offender's access to his partner, but not to the children, may be
limited. The frequency of this dynamic is an important reason why a
mother's hesitation to separate, or seek a protection order should be
taken seriously during safety planning. Examples of this dynamic in
intact couples include threats to report the mother to CPS, using children
to spy on their mother, punishing a mother by denying her access to the
children, hurting the children whenever the mother does something that
makes him jealous, or being passive-aggressive by consenting to care for
the children so the mother can work and then neglecting them. Mothers
caught in this dynamic are particularly susceptible to guilt, whether in-
duced by the offender's accusations or by institutional victim blaming.
The child's risk in these scenarios is a function of the type of abuse
employed (common couple violence, domestic assault or coercive con-
trol) and the extent to which children are implicated in the pattern (e.g.
by "tangential spouse abuse"). In all of these cases, the abusive partner
is the immediate source of threat to the child and therefore the only ap-
propriate target for removal or punitive intervention. At the same time,
the child's vulnerability may condition the mothers, as when the mother
is held hostage by her partner's threats to the children (child abuse as
tangential spouse abuse). The reverse may also be true, namely that the
child may be vulnerable because the offending partner has effectively
disabled the mother's capacity to protect (e.g. by denying her money or
refusing to let her leave the house for food). In these instances, the
safety of either requires a global assessment of the overall levels of vio-
lence and entrapment in the relationship regardless of whether actual
child abuse or neglect has occurred. Child maltreatment in these situa-
tions can be prevented only when it is addressed in tandem with interven-
tions that remove the offending partner and protect and empower the
victimized caretaker. To devise such interventions requires frank sharing
of information, a realistic picture of the constraints on the victim's
choices, mutual and independent planning for safety of mother and child
based on the child's developmental age and the victim's experience with
the offender, and a reliance on the victim to make protective decisions if
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given the resources and opportunity to do so safely. 70 The data on bat-
tered mothers in the CPS caseload suggest that such a response is not
only required, but that it is also feasible given the relative strengths of
this population and the resiliency typically demonstrated by the children
involved.
Current policies and practices by CPS agencies like ACS aggravate
"the battered mother's dilemma" and the probability that child abuse, as
tangential spouse abuse, will occur. While the offending partner is the
principal source of the mother's dilemmas, these are often exacerbated
by the agencies to which the victim turns for help, particularly those
agencies responsible for child protection, CPS and the courts. In the
Yale Trauma Studies, for example, we found that children darted for
child abuse or neglect were more likely to be placed if their mother was
battered than if she was not, even when we controlled for the level of
injury alleged to the child, a frankly punitive response.7 1 Current CPS
policy and practice aggravate the battered mother's dilemma in a number
of ways. For instance, the increasing propensity for CPS agencies and
courts to equate domestic violence with abuse or neglect means that if a
mother reports domestic violence to ACS she risks losing her child, an
example of the battered mother's dilemma. If she does not report, how-
ever, she risks further harm to herself or her child. Moreover, because
the mother cannot talk forthrightly with the case-worker, given the policy
implications, she may misrepresent her situation, further increasing her
vulnerability to punitive interventions (because she is perceived as un-
trustworthy and reinforcing the mistaken perception that she is ambiva-
lent about the violent partner or resisting services).
The ACS practices documented in Nicholson also lend credibility to
the batterer's threat that if the victim disobeys him, she will lose her
children-another example of child abuse as tangential spouse abuse.72
Through the review process, the NRC found that caseworkers routinely
delivered so-called "safety" plans (e.g. going to a shelter, leaving the
abuser, or moving) as what, given the punitive consequences of noncom-
pliance, amounted to a mandated service, and without consultation with
the client or domestic violence expertise. In one case brought to the
NRC by plaintiff attorneys, for instance, the victimized caretaker was
cited for neglect because she had failed to personally serve her abusive
partner with a protection order. The devil's choice in this instance is
either to put herself and the child at further risk or lose the child.
70. Susan Schechter & Jeffrey Edleson, In the Best Interest of Women and Children: A Call
for Collaboration Between Child Welfare and Domestic Violence Constituencies, at
http://www.mincava umn.edu/documents/wingsp/wingsp.html-
71. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 15, at 103-05.
72. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 167.
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Mothers frequently were placed in similar dilemmas involving los-
ing their children of losing their low-rent housing, employment or sup-
port network (by entering a shelter, for instance). ACS training materials
emphasized that battered mothers might be "ambivalent" about separat-
ing from offending partners because of their psychological investment in
the relationship, not because of the risks involved. This emphasis rein-
forced the view that non-offending mothers had to be pressured or
threatened into doing the right thing for their children, an approach
which almost always backfired. Again, the CPS response is self-
fulfilling: against the intimidating context within which safety concerns
are addressed, women are reluctant to report domestic violence until it
escalates to a point where children face imminent danger. In sum, in
addition to being insensitive to victim needs and leaving them at even
greater risk, typical CPS policies and practices also aggravate the possi-
bility that children will be harmed in families where domestic violence
occurs. During the review process, ACS introduced multidisciplinary
teams that included domestic violence expertise. Although caseworkers
were encouraged to utilize such expertise, there were no consequences
when they did not and they sometimes proceeded with victim-blaming
and punitive interventions despite the contrary advice of the domestic
violence expertise at their disposal.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED
The Nicholson decision with the Nicholson Review Committee
(NRC) as the monitor of compliance aimed at stopping the ACS practice
of removing children from mothers and charging the mothers with ne-
glect solely because they were victims of domestic violence or because
they had refused services mandated because of domestic violence. In
response to the injunction ACS sharply curtailed its removal of children
solely because their mother is abused; dramatically reduced the number of
mothers cited for neglect because of domestic violence; informed staff and
clients about the requirements of Nicholson; revised its domestic violence
curriculum to reflect Nicholson; made domestic violence expertise available
to frontline staff through Consultation Teams; developed a training program
for staff on emergency removal that is consistent with Nicholson; devised a
system to monitor cases involving domestic violence and to selectively
review practice in these cases; and implemented a process to ensure that
attorneys draft petitions that are consistent with the principles enunciated in
Nicholson.
Only time will tell whether the practices found unconstitutional will
be resumed without the temporary injunction in place and without the
surveillance of the NRC. The decision by the New York Court of Ap-
peals upholding the principles enunciated in Nicholson make it possible
for plaintiffs to go to state courts if the behaviors found unconstitutional
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in Nicholson are continued. 73 By the time the NRC disbanded, the only
petitions primarily concerning domestic violence were filed against the
offending father. There were still petitions being filed against women
who had been abused, but the primary allegation in these cases usually
involved another issue, like substance abuse or leaving a child on their
own. The NRC was concerned that pre-textual allegations are being used
to conceal the prosecution or indication of mothers primarily due to domes-
tic violence. In one case we reviewed, for instance, the allegation that the
battered mother had left her children alone was based solely on the report
of a neighbor that was never verified and the pertinent issue for ACS
seemed to be that she had failed to personally serve her partner with the
court order she had secured. Caseworkers could consult domestic vio-
lence experts on newly installed Consultation Teams. But they were
under no obligation to follow their recommendations. So, the case-
worker in the example above continued to pressure the mother to enforce
the court order, although the domestic violence expert from the ACS
multidisciplinary team she had consulted strongly advised against this
approach.
Apart from reviewing departmental statistics on removals and re-
viewing the petitions to assess the basis for going to court, the NRC had
no way to tell whether frontline practices with respect to battered moth-
ers and their children have changed. To get at case practice, we pro-
posed to conduct a "quality service review" of several cases involving
domestic violence. These reviews look at every aspect of the agency-
family interaction, relying on direct interviews with family members,
caseworkers, supervisors and any other professional or related persons
involved in the case. This initiative was frustrated by ACS, although
they were to select the target families. Several issues were also not ad-
dressed by ACS. There was no more evidence that frontline staff were
being held accountable to the agency's domestic violence policies after
the two year review process than before, for example, let alone to the
recommendations of the multidisciplinary teams. Nor was there any
substantial shift in the resources allocated to domestic violence within
the agency. Although anywhere between twenty and fifty percent of the
CPS caseload involves domestic violence, only a tiny proportion of the
agency's funds were being devoted to this problem. An outstanding is-
sue was the ease with which "indicated" parties are placed on New York
State's "black list" (and so cannot get positions in child care) and the
difficulty of getting off the list, even after a case is withdrawn.
In its concluding report, the NRC articulated its assessment of what
had been accomplished. We wrote:
73. Id. at 260.
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Nicholson not only enunciated the law. As is now widely acknowl-
edged throughout the country, Nicholson also identified grievous
harms to battered women and their children and outlined a set of
principles to redress this harm. Even after months of testimony by
plaintiff mothers, significant findings of constitutional violations by a
federal court and two years of operating under a temporary injunction
enforced by the NRC, ACS remains equivocal in its acceptance of re-
sponsibility for these harms7 4
Operating under the terms of the temporary injunction, the nation's
largest child welfare agency has come to the brink of implementing a
model of what it means to protect children exposed to domestic violence
and preserve their families in ways that are supportive, just and respect-
ful. 75 It would indeed be tragic if, out of the public limelight afforded by
Nicholson and without the scrutiny provided by the NRC, ACS reverted
to the punitive, unfair and unconstitutional practices it has done so much
to undo. Our hope that this will not be the case is based on the compe-
tence, commitment and judgment of the ACS leadership.
76
I do not share even the limited optimism expressed by this assess-
ment. Far from being the actions of a an agency that is out of the main-
stream, I believe that the responses of ACS to battered mothers are the
culmination of two processes, the constraints on effective intervention in
family problems imposed by the narrow mission of child saving and the
long history of child welfare in this country. Both reflect a core dilemma
in child services, how to protect children without confronting the envi-
ronmental and political contexts from which harms to children arise.
These contexts are reflected in woman battering, where individual men
exploit persistent sexual inequalities to coerce and control individual
women who, in many cases, are also mothers. By all accounts, woman
battering is the single most important context from which children enter
the child protection system, whether rightly or wrongly. The idea that
we discharge our responsibility to the victims in these situations by re-
moving the children from possible threats is wrong in both its sub-
stance-because the risks to children almost certainly increase with
placement in foster care-and in form, because, as Judge Weinstein put
so clearly, it is so patently unjust to punish those who are already being
victimized.77
In its construction, the NRC reflected the lawsuit itself. Each mem-
ber, with the marked exception of our Chair, retired North Carolina fam-
ily court Judge William Jones, was appointed to represent a different
party in the dispute. With very few and very limited exceptions, we were
74. Nicholson Review Committee Report, to Judge Jack B. Weinstein, United States District
Judge, Eastern District of New York, 10 (Dec. 17, 2004) (on file with author).
75. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
76. Supra note 74.
77. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
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able to do what the parties could not: we reached consensus on every
complaint that we heard. Although some of us thought there were other
ways to approach our charge, we agreed to operate as a complaint-driven
process, pursuing the complaints as a window to understand how the
agency was complying with the injunction and what remedies were nec-
essary. The sense that changed policy might not be reflected in reformed
treatment of battered women and their children was also shared. It may
be going too far to say that we also agreed that the capacity for CPS to
treat battered mothers as women with needs in their own right was un-
dermined by a mission-driven accountability structure that directs inter-
vention away from appropriate practice and towards victim-blaming
strategies, including placement. Even within that context, however, we
shared a faith that caseworkers might better learn how to "walk in the
shoes" of their abused clients, to recognize their commitment to what
was best for their children and, from this vantage, to reframe their
choices in ways that afforded women the autonomy they needed to es-
cape the dilemmas in which they had been put by their abusive partner.
In Ms. Nicholson's case, this would have meant trusting her confidence
that her husband was no longer a threat. In Ms. Tillet's, it would have
meant asking "what is the context?" before assuming that letting her abu-
sive partner drive her home meant she was "ambivalent" about protecting
herself or her child from violence. Partner, don't patronize, became one
of our watchwords.
Everyone involved on the NRC concurred that ACS's practices with
respect to battered women were unconstitutional and needed to stop. But
throughout our preparation for Nicholson and the review process, we
continued to debate what we saw as the ultimate solution. Should ACS
identify battered women and immediately refer them to the advocacy
system for assessment and support? Could we reform ACS from within,
by bringing domestic violence expertise on board for instance, the way
they've done in Massachusetts? Should we work to expand the respon-
sibility of CPS to include the safety of all family members? Or, should
we return the detection and response of child abuse to the police, disman-
tle the current CPS system and find a more effective way to help families
brought low by the range of problems currently identified with "ne-
glect?" Obviously, resolving this debate goes far beyond the scope of
our discussion today.

